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INTRODUCTION

Mr. J is a 75-year-old male who, because of a previous leg
amputation and the need for chronic dialysis, lived with and was cared
for by his two sons.... He suffers from complications of diabetes and is
admitted to the hospital for amputation of his other leg.
Approximately five days post-amputation [of his second leg],
Mr. J suffered a respiratory arrest, was resuscitated and transferred to the
ICU. This began Mr. 's five month odyssey of multiple transfers into
and out of all three adult ICUs as a result of multiple resuscitations.
Because the sons refused to accept anything less than a miraculous
healing for their father, they adamantly refused to agree to DNR [Do Not
Resuscitate] status. On one occasion they demanded that the resuscitation
be continued, resulting in a 55 minute resuscitative effort. They viewed
each successful resuscitation as "minor miracles" that would result in a
final "major miracle" (Mr. J being able to leave the hospital and give
testimony to his cure).
An Ethics Rapid Response consult approximately three months
into his hospital stay acknowledged the impossible nature of the dilemma
faced and advocated an emphasis on meeting Mr. J's symptom
management needs for the duration of his hospital stay.
The chasm between the physicians' perspective of futile care and
the sons' perspective of miracles widened and deepened over the fivemonth period. The physicians struggled with being put in an untenable
position of violating the ethical principles of beneficence, nonmalfeasance, and justice (both personal and distributive) while the sons
stood firm on their legal surrogate decision making role, viewing
themselves as protecting their father's autonomy by making decisions for
him that they believed to be in his best interest.
Mr. J died on the 147th day of his hospital stay, surrounded not
by family, but rather by the Code Blue team who attempted one final, but
futile, resuscitation effort. 2
2

Sr. Julie Mantemach, Chaplain, A Tale of an End-of-life Journey, Address at

the Project of Compassionate Health Care and Responsible Stewardship, Aug.
26, 2005. Patient and family's identification have been changed for
confidentiality purposes.
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Mr. J is but one example of patients experiencing prolonged pain
due to technological advances and raised expectations of patients and
their families. 3 Many patients experience extended periods of suffering
during the dying process due to patient or family members' desires to do
everything possible. Modem medical technology has produced a group
of "half-way technologies" that allow physicians to "maintain the
physiologic basis of life but not reverse pathologic processes." 5 Often
these treatments prove non-beneficial and even harmful.6
Should a physician be allowed to withdraw or withhold
continued treatment, even over the objections of a competent patient or
their representative? Or should the patient or their representative dictate
treatment regardless of their physician's clinical judgment or the cost of
the medical
the demanded treatment? These are some of the questions
7 has been grappling with since the mid 1980s. 8
community
These cases differ from the traditional right-to-die cases in which
the patient or proxy refuses treatment. In the early right-to-die cases, e.g.
Karen Quinlan 9 and Nancy Cruzan, patients or their families refused

3 See

generally Health Council of South Florida, Inc., The Medical Futility
available
at
4,
(2000),
Florida,
of
South
Guidelines
http://www.healthcouncil.org/publications/futility.html.
4 See Gay Moldow et al., Why Address Medical Futility Now?, MINN. MED.,
(June

2004),

available

http://www.mmaonline.net/publications/MNMed2004/June/Moldow.html
visited Mar. 21, 2006).
5 Id.

at

(last

6id.

7 "Medical community" refers to the healthcare systems: physicians, other
clinicians, ethicists, hospital administrators and attorneys.
8 Paul R. Helft et. al, The Rise and Fall of the Futility Movement, 343 NEw ENG.
at
available
293
(2000),
293,
J.
MED.
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/343/4/293?maxtoshow=&HITS=20&hits
=20&RES.
9 Yet this early right-to-die case began "this nation on a course away from
medical paternalism, and toward a future in which the wishes of patients would
the gold standard for ethical decision-making
prevail. Patient autonomy is ...
when recommended care conflicts with a patient's wishes." Jerry Menikoff,
DemandedMedical Care, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1091, 1091 (1998).
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medical treatment.' 0 These right-to-die cases established patients' rights
The
to refuse life-sustaining treatment or demand its withdrawal."
concepts of privacy, patient autonomy, and informed consent established
that patients (not their physicians) should make treatment decisions.12
Paradoxically, the battle today between physicians and patients is not
likely to regard patients and physicians disagreeing over care that
physicians recommend. Rather, the battle consists of patients or their
surrogates demanding care that their physicians believe is futile or
medically inappropriate.13 Has the right to refuse treatment been
extended to encompass a positive right to demand medical treatment
regardless of cost or physicians' clinical judgment? 14 Does legal
precedent establish a patient's right to demand treatment or a physician's
right to refuse treatment deemed futile?
This comment will suggest that the solution to the conflict
between physicians and patients regarding futile care is a process-based
approach to deciding end-of-life decisions.' 5 Part I of this comment will
'o See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
1 Keith Shiner, Note, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 803, 805 (1996). Quinlan and Cruzan are often cited as the beginning of
patient/surrogate rights to demand the withdrawal or withholding of lifesustaining treatment based on a patient's right to privacy. Philip G. Peters,
When Physicians Balk at Futile Care: Implications of the Disability Rights
Laws, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 798, 798 (1997).
12 See Shirley E. Sanematsu, Taking a Broader View of Treatment
Disputes
beyond Managed Care: Are Recent legislative efforts the cure?, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1245, 1254-55 (2001); Matthew S. Ferguson, Ethical Postures of Futility
and California's Uniform Health Care DecisionsAct, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217,
1217 (2002).
13Menikoff, supra note 9, at 1091.
14 In healthcare decisions, a "positive" right is the right to be free to make any
healthcare decisions one desires. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE
RIGHT To DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISION MAKING, § 13.06 (3d ed.
Supp. 2004).
15 "The emphasis of the [due process] approach ... is on fair process between
parties rather than on ... definition ... of the parties. Professional standards ...
patient rights, intent standards, and family or community involvement usually
should be accommodated in the process of deliberation." AMA Council on
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begin with a review of the various attempts at defining futility, including
identifying what is not futility. It will reveal the futility of the search for
an absolute definition' 6of medical futility "since it is inherently a valueladen determination."'
Part II will review the evolution of addressing futile care in the
United States (alternatively "U.S.") and Great Britain (alternatively
"U.K."). This section will focus on the major cases that have provided
patients and their families the legal right to die1 7 and the progression of
patients and their families moving away from the "paternalistic"
physician1 8 towards demanding treatment that physicians and facilities
have deemed futile in the U.S..' 9 Further analysis of federal and state
statutory laws will be reviewed to determine the current legal status of
futility as a positive or negative right in the U.S..
Contrasted with the status of futility in the U.S. will be the
review of futility in the U.K. that "mere life for its own sake is not worth
spending money on if there is an opportunity cost for those resources that
could otherwise be spent providing definite benefits and high
probability. '20 The British National Health System has court-appointed
authority to ration care based on "clinical guidelines that blend efficacy
of outcomes, quality of life judgments, and economics.", 21 This comment
will also review British Case Law, which has established no duty to
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Medical Futility in End-of-Life Care, 281 JAMA

937, 942 (1999) availableat http://www.icampus.ucl.ac.be/medoc/jama.htm.
16Id.at 941.

In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
18 Anne Federwisch, Medical futility: Who has the power to
decide?,
Nurseweek, July 2, 1998, http:www.nurseweek.com/features/98-7/limits.html
(last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
'9 See e.g., In Re: The Conservatorship of Helga M. Wanglie, 7 ISSUEs L. &
MED. 369 (1991-92).(include a parenthetical)
20 Howard Brody & Raanan Gillon, Futile Care Treatment: Perspectives
from
the United States and United Kingdom, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 529, 540
17

(1998).
21 Id. at 543; Wesley J. Smith, The English Patient, The Weekly Standard,
May
30,
2005,
available
at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=5645&

R=C6DB31.
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22
continue life-prolonging treatment even if the patient may desire it.
Further attention will be paid to the recent saga of Leslie Burke23 in the
U.K. and his suit against the General Medical Counsel (GMC) regarding
his contention that the withholding of artificial nutrition against his
desires would be a violation of his human rights under the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).24
Part III of this comment will conclude with the argument for
establishing process-based approaches to address medical futility as an
established communication standard from which physicians and patients
or families may successfully address futility. Process-based approaches
in the U.S will be identified and the "legality" of the process-based
approach will be explored. Finally, the evolution of the Texas Advanced
Directive statute, the only codified process-based approach to futility in
the U.S., will be discussed and its ramification on patients in Texas will
be reviewed.25

I. DEFINING FUTILITY

"I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced.... [b]ut I know it when I see it....,,26 These
words illustrate the Supreme Court's frustration in its fifty-year struggle
at describing obscenity. 27 This reaction to an attempt at defining
"obscene" is similar to the confusion and controversy surrounding
attempts to define "medical futility.

28

22 In re J, [1992] 3 W.L.R. 507 (Fam), [1993] Fam. 15 (Eng.).
23

Leslie Burke, an English citizen, suffers from a degenerative brain condition

and was fearful that artificial nutrition might be withheld from him.

The UK enacted the European Convention on Human Rights Act of 1998 on
Oct. 2, 2000.
25 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon 2003).
24

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). Famous quote from Justice
Potter exemplifies the struggle the Supreme Court has had in their attempts at

26

defining
what speech qualifies as "obscene."
27

id.

28

Anne Federwisch, Medical Futility. Who has the Power to Decide?, Nurse

Week, July 2, 1998, http://www.nurseweek.com/features/98-7/limits.html.
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"Numerous definitions of futility have been proposed, but none
have been universally accepted., 29 Some definitions of futility appear
under inclusive, others over inclusive, while others appear both under
inclusive and over inclusive. 30 The American Medical Association's
(AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs has stated, "[F]utility ...
cannot be meaningfully defined."'3'

"standard"

The issue with developing a

clinical definition of futility is that it contains value
judgments about the characteristics of a particular patient's life.32
Consequently, what one physician might consider futile may not be
considered futile by the patient or her family or even other physicians.33
A.

Why Define Futility?

There are several reasons for clearly defining what futility means
and determining how to manage medical care in those situations. First,
one should query at what point care or intervention is futile in light of the
existence of "half-way technologies" permitting physicians to maintain
certain biological systems even when cognitive human life is not
evident. 34 Second, modem day medicine related to life-sustaining
interventions is expensive. 35 Even though physicians are instructed to do
everything within their power to benefit their patients, the AMA's
AscensionHealth.org,
Health
Care
Ethics:
Futility,
http://www.ascensionhealth.org/ethics/public/issues/futility.asp
(last visited
Mar. 25, 2006).
29

Mark Strasser, The Futility of Futility?: On Life, Death, and Reasoned Public
Policy, 57 MD. L. REV. 505, 514 (1998).
30

31 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT

E-2.035 (2004), available at http://www.amassn.org/ama/pub/category/8389.html.
OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS

Lanie
Olmstead,
Medical
http://www.wramc.amedd.army.mil/departments/Judge/futility.htm
32

Futility,
(last visited

Mar. 25, 2006).
33 Id.

34 Moldow et al., supra note 4.
35 See Gilmer et al., The Costs of Nonbeneficial Treatment in the Intensive Care

Setting, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2005, at 962 (stating that in the United States,
services provided in the ICU accounts for 20 percent of inpatient costs, currently
0.9 percent of the annual gross domestic product).
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Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs Code of Medical Ethics do allow
physicians to review ethically appropriate criteria related to cost when
determining treatment for their patients.36
Third, dilemmas relating to futility have resulted in high-profile
court cases, such as those of Gilgunn, Burke, Baby K, and Wangile.3 7

Patients and health care systems would benefit if the medical community
could resolve futility issues outside the arena of the courtroom. Finally,
medical-decision authority has moved away from the more paternalistic
model of physicians determining the course of treatment, with little or no
input from the patient and their family, towards the patient and family
having more decision-making power. 38 A clear definition of futility
would be helpful to patients and their family when asserting their
authority in the face of a physician's refusal to provide care.
B.

What Futility is Not

Perhaps one can better understand the concept of "futility" by
examining how futility is not defined. Futility does not refer to patients
or treatments in a general sense. Futility applies to the treatment being
performed or considered on an individual patient at a particular point in

supra note 30,
at
E-2.03,
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/apps/pf~new/pf~online?f_n=resuitLink&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E2.03.HTM&st=allocation+of+limited+medical+resources&catg=AMA/HnE&c
atg=AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth= 1&&st_p=0&nth= 1&.
31 In re Baby "K," 823 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd 16 F.3d 590 (4th
Cir. 1994);
36 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS,

Robert J. Dzielak, Physicians Lose the Tug of War to Pull the Plug: The Debate
About Continued Futile Medical Care, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 733, 748
(1995); Patient Loses Right-to-Food Case, BBC News, July 28, 2005,

http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/47
21061.stm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006); Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health
System,

Catherine

Gilgunn,

http://www.sclhsc.org/about/missionvision/ethicalissues/catherinegilgunn.ht
m (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
38 Dzielak, supra note 37, at 733.
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time. 39 The treatment being performed or considered can only be
considered futile if it does not or will not achieve medicine's goals of
benefiting that particular patient.4a
Futility is not rationing health care.4 Futility involves decisions
regarding the benefit of medical treatment to the patient, while
rationing 2 explores cost consideration and the availability of particular
resources in relation to the proposed treatment.43 Rationing is therefore a
derivation of Distributive Justice. 4 As the patient's advocate, a physician
should provide care regardless of cost. 45 If the intervention is deemed
39 LAWRENCE J. SCHNEIDERMAN

&

NANCY S. JECKER, WRONG MEDICINE:

DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND FUTILE TREATMENT

8 (1995) [hereinafter WRONG

MEDICINE].
40 id.

41 See id. at 79.
42 An example of medical rationing reasoning:
[Dr. Vincent] finally blurted out. "Look, the guy is
already in his 80s. I just don't think it's right to be
spending tens or what could be even hundreds of
thousands of dollars on him when the best we can do
is give him maybe a year or two more of poor quality
of life, if that much. Meanwhile look at all the other
people - kids, particularly - who have their whole
life ahead of them - they're the one we should be
giving this treatment to." The other doctors chimed in
their agreement
Id. at 66.
43 Shiner, supra note 11, at 826.
44 "Principles of distributive justice are normative principles designed to allocate
goods in limited supply relative to demand" Plato.stanford.edu, Distributive
Justice, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2006).
45 "A physician has a duty to do all that he or she can for the benefit of the
individual patient. ... Physicians have a responsibility to participate and to
contribute their professional expertise in order to safeguard the interests of
patients in decisions made at the societal level regarding the allocation or
rationing of health resources." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 30, at E-2.03, available at http://www.amaassn.org/apps/pf new/pf onlineffn=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E-
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futile, however, the physician or facility is not ethically bound to
continue treatment no matter the cost (even if the resource is cheap and
abundant).46
Palliative care should not be considered futile; 47 in fact, futility
disputes could actually be considered the antithesis of palliative care. 48
In futile care, physicians are giving treatment that may only result in pain49
and other symptoms without any hope of significant benefit.
Conversely, "palliative care improves the quality of a patient's life, even
if the intervention may not prolong the length of survival."5 °
C. Attempts at Defining Futility
To address futility appropriately, the medical community
must reach a consensus about a definition or seek some other process
from which to address the problem. 51 Several attempts at defining
futility warrant mention.

2.03.HTM&st=allocation+of+limited+medical+resources&catg=AMA/HnE&c
atg=AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth= 1&&stp=0&nth= 1&.
46 "Physicians are not ethically obligated to deliver care that, in their best
professional judgment, will not have a reasonable chance of benefiting their
Id.
at
E-2.035,
available
at
http://www.amapatients."
assn.org/apps/pfnew/pf onlinef_n=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E2.035.HTM&st=allocation+of+limited+medical+resources&catg=AMA/HnE&
catg=AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth= 1&&st_p=O&nth=2&.
47 Id.
48

Joseph J. Fins, Principles in Palliative Care: An Overview,

RESPIRATORY

J. (2000), at http://www.rcjoumal.com/contents/11.00/11.00.1320.asp
(last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
CARE
49

Id.

50

Olmstead, supra note 32.

"

ERICH H. LOEWY & ROBERTA S LOEWY, TEXTBOOK OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS

297 (2d ed. 2004).
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1. Physiological Futility

Physiological futility can be described as treatment that will not
achieve its physiological goal and therefore will afford no physiological
benefit to the patient. 53 An example of physiological futility would be a
physician prescribing an antibiotic to treat a viral infection. Since
antibiotics 4combat bacteria they would be ineffective in treating viral
5
infections.
Although physiological futility may be the easiest definition of
futility to analyze in practice, an approach that only accounts for
psychological futility has several problems. 55 First, such a definition
could easily prohibit physicians from properly determining a treatment's
futility, because the treatment would maintain a biological function of
the body even though the patient may be persistently unconscious or
terminally ill. 56 Furthermore, the value of an intervention cannot be
judged by physiological outcome alone. Physiological outcomes often
vary, and physicians are often unable to determine when an intervention
may be of little or no physiological benefit.5 7 Case law, however, does
support the position that when a patient receives no physiological benefit
from a treatment, a physician has no legal obligation to provide
or
58
continue that course of treatment regardless of patient authorization.

52

Physiological is a "characteristic of or appropriate to an organism's healthy or

normal functioning"

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

888 (9th

ed. 1991), availableat http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/physiological.
53 The Medical Futility Guidelines of South Florida, supra note 3, at 6.
54 Eric M. Levine, A New Predicamentfor Physicians: The Concept of Medical
Futility, the Physician's Obligation to Render InappropriateTreatment, and the
Interplay of the Medical Standard of Care, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 69, 74 (19941995).
55 Menikoff, supra note 9, at 1095.
56
57

The Medical Futility Guidelines of South Florida, supra note 3, at 6.

See Ralph Cohen-Almagor, Language and Reality at the End of Life, 28 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 267, 270-71 (2000).
58 MEISEL, supra note 14, at 13-15.
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2. Qualitative Futility
Some commentators deem qualitative futility as the most
controversiali 9 Schneiderman and Jecker define the qualitative feature of
medical futility as: "[i]f a patient lacks the capacity to appreciate the
benefit of a treatment, or if the treatment fails to release a patient from
total dependence on intensive medical care." 60 In other words, is the
patient's quality of life so diminished (e.g. permanent unconsciousness)
life? 61
that it could be considered futile to continue the patient's
Determining the quality of a patient's life in relation to a given treatment
therefore becomes a value judgment, one that physicians are ill qualified
to determine alone.62
The qualitative view of futility directly clashes with the notion of
patient autonomy. 63 Courts have moved away from the paternalistic
physicians' model (under which the physicians could determine the
benefits of a treatment for a given patient) towards the principle of
patient autonomy. 64 "Now they [doctors] can sustain life beyond our
wildest former expectations, but once patients realize the hollowness of
such mechanical life, those patients who want to die [or in the opposite
'5
6
case, the proxy who wants everything possible done] sue their doctors.
3. Quantitative Futility
Shiner characterizes quantitative futility as a "a treatment [that]
has proved ineffective in the last one hundred cases," 66 that is, the
probability of a given treatment's success drops so low, that one could
59 Menikoff, supra note 9, at 1096.
60 WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 39, at 17.
61 By this definition, continued medical treatment (e.g. respirator or feeding
tube) in a persistently unconscious person would be considered futile since it
simply maintains the patient's chronic vegetative state.
62 Menikoff, supra note 9, at 1097.
63 Shiner, supra note 11, at 830.
64Id. at 832.
65 Brian C. Kalt, Death, Ethics, and the State, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 487,
501 (2000).
Shiner, supra note 11, at 828.

66
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consider it futile.67 An example of this kind of futility is providing
CPR 68 to an elderly patient with metastatic 69 cancer. 70 As more
therapeutic options have become available, this struggle with uncertainty
can lead to a paralysis of action.71 If a physician can never be one
hundred percent sure that a treatment will fail or succeed, is there not a
moral obligation to do anything that might work? 72 This situation is yet
another instance where for individual values will predominate decision
making, which again cannot be adequately addressed by physicians
alone.
4. Hybrid Quantitative and Qualitative Futility
Scheniderman and Jecker combine the different aspects of
quantitative and qualitative into their general definition of futility:
Medicalfutility means any effort to provide a benefit to a
patient that is highly likely to fail and whose rare
exceptions cannot be systematically produced. [emphasis
in the original]... [T]his definition has a quantitative

component ("highly likely to fail") and a qualitative
component ("benefit to the patient").. .[T]he focus of the
effort is the patient (derived from the Latin word for 'to
suffer'), not some organ or physiological function or

67Menikoff, supra note

9, at 1098.
68 Contrary to popular belief, "[O]nly about 15% of hospitalized patients in
whom resuscitation is attempted will survive to discharge. ... Patients over 70
years of age who have sepsis or metastatic carcinoma, or whose arrest lasts more
than 15 minutes are unlikely to survive." Healthcare Ethics, Cardiopulmonary
(2005),
Resuscitation
http://www.ascensionhealth.org/ethics/public/issues/cardio.asp (last visited Mar.
24, 2006).
69 Metastatic cancer is cancer that has spread or metastasizes to other areas of
the body.
70 Olmstead, supra note 32.
71 WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 39, at 14.
72

Id. at 14-15.
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body substance... [W]hat is provided is a benefit, not an
effect.73
Scheniderman and Jecker stress the provision of "benefit" over
"effect," due to the enormous range of effects that modem medicine can
produce on the human body. 74 Physicians can create or cause multiple

effects on even an unconscious patient, yet if these actions have no
benefit, the authors argue the treatment is futile.75
Although these definitions have been helpful in framing the
futility argument, they have been unsuccessful in determining a
definitive definition of futility.76 Even those who accept the concepts of

on how to draw the dividing
quantitative and qualitative futility disagree
77
care.
non-futile
and
futile
line between
II. FUTILITY IN THE U.S. & U.K.
In the U.K., Charlotte Wyatt was born prematurely requiring

ventilation for most of her first three months. She suffers from severe
brain, kidney, and lung damage. As a result, Baby Charlotte, as she
came to be known, is:
[B]lind, deaf and incapable of voluntary movement or
response. It is very highly probable that she will during
this winter succumb to a respiratory infection that will
prove fatal. That said the unanimous medical evidence
also recognizes that in this area there is no such thing as
certainty of prognosis or survival.78

73
74 Id.

75

at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Some examples of these effects include: "adding and subtracting body

chemicals, increasing and reducing circulating blood cells, destroying cancer
cells, restoring the heartbeat, replacing kidney function, killing bacteria,
subduing viruses and fungi...." Id.
76 Menikoff, supra note 9, at 1099.
77 Id.
78

Portsmouth NHS Trust v. Wyatt & Ors, [2004] EWHC (Fam.) 2247 (Eng.).
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A British judge held that doctors do not have to attempt
resuscitation of Charlotte if she stops breathing.79
Now that she has survived past her second birthday, Mr. Justice
Hedley has, in turn, discharged his year-old ruling on October 21, 2005
which stated "that doctors would not be acting unlawfully if they decided
it was not in the child's best interests to artificially ventilate her in a lifethreatening situation."80
Yet, doctors at St Mary's Hospital in
Portsmouth claim that they still have the final decision in determining the
best treatment for Charlotte: "[I]f there is a future disagreement we have
a very clear direction from the court ... doctors are not required to
ventilate Charlotte when it is not in her best interest to do so.',8 I

In the U.S., Baby K was born in an anencephalic state. 2 She
was transferred to a nursing home for ongoing care with an agreement
that the hospital would readmit her if she again developed respiratory
distress.8 3 After several re-admissions for respiratory distress requiring
ventilator treatment, the hospital sought "declaratory judgment absolving
the hospital of liability under the Emergency Medical Treatment and
79

Id. at 9.

Timesonline.co.uk, Baby Charlotte wins reprieve on her second birthday,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1836900,00.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2006).
81 id.
82 Anencephalic state:
80

Anencephaly is a congenital defect in which the brain stem is
present but the cerebral cortex is rudimentary or absent. There
is no treatment that will cure, correct, or ameliorate
anencephaly. Baby K is permanently unconscious and cannot
hear or see. Lacking a cerebral function, Baby K does not feel
pain. Baby K has brain stem functions primarily limited to
reflexive actions such as feeding reflexes (rooting, sucking,
swallowing), respiratory reflexes (breathing, coughing), and
reflexive responses to sound or touch. Baby K has a normal
heart rate, blood pressure, liver function, digestion, kidney
function, and bladder function and has gained weight since her
birth. Most anencephalic infants die within days of birth.
In the Matter of Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Va.) (1993).
83

Id.
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Active Labor Act (EMTALA)84 if the hospital refused to provide
ventilator treatment when Baby K next experienced respiratory
distress. 85
The court ruled that the plain language of EMTALA required
that respiratory treatment (life-saving treatment) be given to Baby K.86
EMTALA, a U.S. Federal law, requires that life-sustaining treatment be
given to any individual who comes to an emergency room requiring
emergency treatment. 87 Some commentators argue that the reasoning of

84

Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) , 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (2000).
85 Strasser, supra note 29, at 507.
86 id.
87 Hospitals with emergency medical departments must provide an appropriate
medical screening to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists
for any individual who comes to the emergency room seeking treatment. 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (2000). The statute defines an "emergency medical
condition" as including:
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in
(i) placing the health of the individual ... in serious jeopardy, (ii)
serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of
any bodily organ or part.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000);
The Court determined that in the application of EMTALA to Baby K:
[T]he Hospital concedes that when Baby K is presented in respiratory
distress a failure to provide 'immediate medical attention' would
reasonably be expected to cause serious impairment of her bodily
functions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A). Thus, her breathing
difficulty qualifies as an emergency medical condition, and the
diagnosis of this emergency medical condition triggers the duty of the
hospital to provide Baby K with stabilizing treatment ... [s]ince
transfer is not an option available.., the Hospital must stabilize Baby
K's condition.
Baby K, 832 F.3d at 594.
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the court in Baby K regarding EMTALA is "flawed. 88 As a result of the
decision, Baby K lived until she was two and one-half years old.89
These two cases are representative of the futility debates in both
the U.S. and U.K.. The British courts usually support rational medical
decision-making to withhold or withdraw futile care.90 On the other
hand, litigated cases in the U.S. usually disallow physicians from
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment without the
consent of the patient or surrogate. 9'
A. The United States
In the U.S., "the withholding and withdrawal of life support is
legally justified primarily by the principles of informed consent and
informed refusal, both of which have strong support in the common
law. 92 Patients or their surrogates can either approve the proposed
treatment (informed consent) or refuse any and all therapies (informed
refusal).93 With this emphasis on patient autonomy has come the
evolution of patients demanding not only that care be discontinued, but
88 MEISEL,

supra note 14, at 13-30; Strasser, supra note 30, at 508-09.

But the U.S. Court of Appeals did not consider other federal laws (Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act and Section 302 of the Americans with Disabilities
Act) or Virginia state law (Virginia Medical Malpractice Act) as obligating the
Hospital to provide care to Baby K, since it determined that EMTALA required
the Hospital to render stabilizing treatment. Baby K 832 F.3d at 592.
89 Answers.com, The case of Baby K, http://www.answers.com/topic/baby-k
(last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
90 See LE Hagger, The Human Right Act 1998 and medical treatment: time for
re-examination, 89 ARCHIVES OF DISEASES IN CHILDHOOD 460 (2003) available

at
http://adc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/89/5/460#otherarticles (last
visited Mar. 26, 2006).
91 See, e.g., In the Matter of Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va.) (1993). See
also,42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; Wanglie, supra note 19, at 372 (Hospital denied
guardianship); MEISEL, supra note 14, at 13-6, 17.
92 John M. Luce & Ann Alpers, Legal Aspects of Withholding and Withdrawing
Life Support from Critically Ill Patients in the United States and Providing
Palliative Care to Them, 162 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 2029 (2000).

93 See id. at 2029 (stating that physicians are allowed to provide treatment
without consent in emergency situations).
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also that treatment
be provided even when a physician does not
94
recommend it.

Yet, since no definitive definition of futility has been developed,
these common law proclamations regarding informed consent and
informed denial provide no legal consensus about how futility cases
should be addressed in the U.S. 95 Instead, a variety of conflicting

common law and statutory approaches have developed regarding futile
care. The only consensus regarding futile care in the U.S. regards
physiologic futility. 96 For example, a physician is under
no obligation to
97

continue ventilation of a clinically brain-dead person.
1. The Right to Say No

It has been almost thirty years since the landmark case of Karen
Quinlan (In re Quinlan) in which the question of withholding or
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from a patient was first
determined.98 Quinlan was kept alive by a ventilator after she slipped
into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). 99 Her physicians and hospital
refused her family's request to terminate ventilator treatment. They
94 MEISEL,

supra note 14 at 13-8 - 9.

9' See id.
96 See discussion on Physiologic Futility supra pp. 277-78.
97 See MEISEL, supra note 14, at 13-7.
98 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-63 (N.J. 1976).
99 PVS was first considered a diagnostic entity in 1972. "Until the 1970's and
'80s PVS patients were rarely kept alive for long periods of time." WRONG
MEDICINE, supra note 38, at 3. More regarding PVS:
Individuals in such a state [Persistent Vegetative State] have lost their
thinking abilities and awareness of their surroundings, but retain noncognitive function and normal sleep patterns. Even though those in a
persistent vegetative state lose their higher brain functions, other key
functions such as breathing and circulation remain relatively intact.
Spontaneous movements may occur, and the eyes may open in response
to external stimuli. They may even occasionally grimace, cry, or laugh.
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Coma and Persistent
Vegetative
State
Information
Page,
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/coma/coma.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
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recognized that "Karen's present treatment serves only a maintenance
function; ...the respirator cannot cure or improve her condition but at
best can only prolong her inevitable slow deterioration and death."'100
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a right of privacy in
which the "individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily
invasion increases and the prognosis dims."'0 ' This right to be left alone
is accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 10 2 In allowing Quinlan's right to
privacy, the court recognized a patients' rights movement giving patients
or their guardians the "right to refuse medical treatment, even if that
meant death."' 3 In essence, the family was given the responsibility to do
what Karen would have wanted, and if her wishes were not known, they
4
were given the authority to decide as a proxy for her best interest.1
Karen's respirator was removed, and she lived unaided in her breathing
for another nine years before succumbing to pneumonia. 105
Seven years after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan lost control of her car on a road in Missouri and
10 6
was thrown from her vehicle face down into a water-filled ditch.
Paramedics were able to resuscitate Cruzan, but her injuries resulted in a
diagnosis of PVS. 10 7 Cruzan would be the first time that the U.S.
Supreme Court would address the issue of withholding or withdrawing
life-supporting treatment.
After three years of witnessing their daughter's grotesque
physical changes and with a prognosis of PVS until death, Cruzan's
100 See discussion of "half-way" technologies infra p. 2; Quinlan, supra, note
98,at 663.
o' Id. at 664.
102 ARTHUR

S.

BERGER & JOYCE BERGER,

To

DIE OR NOT TO DIE? CROSS-

DISCIPLINARY, CULTURAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE
DEATH 131 (Praeger Pub.) (1990).
103

Robert M. Veatch & Carol M. Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the

Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 15 (1992).
104id.

Karen
Ann
Quinlan
Hospice,
http://www.karenannquinlanhospice.org/History.htm (last
2006).
105

106

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.

107id.

History,
at
visited Mar. 26,
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parents had requested that her artificial hydration and nutrition be
terminated.10 8 The Missouri Supreme court declared that the state had an
interest in life that was unqualified; consequently, the court ordered that
treatment (artificial nutrition and hydration) must be continued as long as
Cruzan was alive. 10 9 The court stated it would only approve the removal
of Cruzan's feeding tube if "clear and convincing" evidence could
established that she would not want to be kept alive in a PVS state." 0
The Cruzans appealed their case to the U.S. Supreme Court. But
the Court upheld Missouri's evidentiary standard of "clear and
convincing" in determining a patient's wishes ruling that due process
was not violated by such a standard.'11 The Court stated "[t]he choice
between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and
overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to
safeguard the personal element of this' 12choice through the imposition of
heightened evidentiary requirements." "
Yet when the case was remanded to the trial level, the trial court
accepted testimony from Nancy's friends not presented at any of the
early court hearings that she had stated that she would not want to live in
a vegetative state. The trial court accepted this additional evidence as
"clear and convincing," and the state of Missouri chose not to pursue an
appeal. 113 Nancy's medically assisted nutrition and hydration was
removed in December of 1990, and she died two weeks later."14 Her
for them Nancy had died back in 1983, the year of
family maintained that
5
her auto accident."
Unlike Quinlan, the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment in
Cruzan was firmly grounded by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee

'08

See id., at 265.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 423-24 (1988).
11oSee WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 38, at 2.
109

111
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282-83.
112Id. at 281.
"' WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 39, at 2.
114WESLEY J. SMITH, CULTURE OF DEATH (THE ASSAULT ON MEDICAL ETHICS
IN AMERICA) 68-69 (2000).
"' WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 39, at 2.
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of personal liberty.' 6 Additionally, "the Supreme Court's Cruzan ruling
significantly extended the Quinlan decision by including artificial
nutrition and hydration (tube feedings) as medical care that may be
refused or discontinued by the competent patient or surrogate."'" 17 Thus
today, competent patients or their surrogates have a legally protected8
right to say "no" to any treatment, even life-sustaining treatment.1
Quinlan and Cruzan established a patient's right to refuse or demand the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Effectively, this is a "negative"
right. 19 "This negative right of refusal skewed medical decision-making
power in favor of patients."' 2 °
The common law doctrine of informed consent provided yet
another justification for a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment.12 1 Informed consent means that "prior to agreeing to any
116

Nancy Cruzan has a liberty interest under the Due Process clause of the 14th

Amendment. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
117David B. Waisel & Robet D. Truog, The End-of-Life Sequence, 87 J. AM.
SOC'Y
ANESTHESIOLOGISTS
676
(1997),
available
at
http://gateway.ovid.com/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&MODE=ovid&NEWS-n&PAGE =
toc&D=ovft&AN=00000542-000000000-00000.
118id.
119 "Negative right" explained:
A negative right embodies the freedom to do what one wants without
interference from others. The right to refuse medical treatment is such a
right. It is a right to live one's life without being imposed upon by
physicians who, for their own reasons and based on their own values
(however benevolent), might wish to compel an individual to receive
treatment that [the] individual does not want.
MEISEL, supra note 14, at 13-23.
120 Dzielak, supra note 37, at 747.
121 Id., "Under common law, a patient normally must consent to medical
treatment of any kind. Consent is required to maintain the right of personal
inviolability." Keiner v. Cmty. Convalescent Ctr. 549 N.E. 2d 292, 297 (1989).
Furthermore, Justice Cardozo viewing this right in the context of medical
treatment stated: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages." Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
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touching of one's body, an individual must be given information about
the proposed touching. Judicial decisions [generally hold that]under this
doctrine, it is essential for a physician to obtain consent from a patient
before starting any procedure or treatment." 122 Patients are to make the
treatment decisions based on the information provided by their physician.
The patient has a legally protected right to refuse offered medical
treatment under informed consent.' 23
Therefore, the right-to-die
decisions (establishing privacy, liberty, and informed consent for medical
treatment) provided patients or their surrogates in the U.S. the right to
demand or refuse the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
2. A Right to Demand Treatment
Emboldened with the right to say "no" to medical treatment,
patients began to demand that physicians provide medical treatment even
if their physician believed the treatment was inappropriate. 24 Often
these demands for continued care come on behalf of the patient by their
surrogate. 25 Although these cases do not directly address the futility
issue, they demonstrate the expansion of patients' rights from a negative
right to say "no," to a positive right 2 6 to demand healthcare (sanctioned
27
by the court), regardless of cost or physicians' recommendations.
"For a consent to be valid, the physician must give the patient material
information about the course of action proposed, the risks of death or harm the
procedure may entail, the alternate therapies, and the problems that may arise
during the recovery process." BERGER & BERGER, supra note 102, at 132.
122

123

Id.

124

Dzielak, supra note 37, at 744.
See In re Wanglie, supra, note 19, at 371. See also In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590

125

(4th Cir. 1994).
126
Meisel on positive and negative rights:
Like a negative right, a positive right envisions that one should be free
to do what one wants, but rather than envisioning a freedom from specifically, freedom from interference by others - it envisions a
freedom to - specifically, freedom to make the most of one's life with
the resources that one can legitimately superintend without entrenching
on other's freedom to be free from unwanted interference. In the
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One of the first cases to address the issue of a "positive" right
was Helga Wanglie's case, in which Wanglie suffered a cardiac arrest
that rendered her permanently unconscious. 128 After several weeks, the
physicians treating Wanglie determined that continued respiration was
futile and recommended that continued life-sustaining treatment be
29
stopped, but Wanglie's husband refused to discontinue her care.'
Consequently, a lawsuit ensued where Wanglie's physician attempted to
30
have a conservator appointed to determine the best interest of Wanglie.'
who, it reported, was in the
Ultimately, the court appointed Mr. Wanglie
3
best position to act on behalf of his wife.1 '
The court stated:
No court order to continue or stop any medical treatment
for Helga Wanglie has been made or requested at this
time. Whether such a request will be made, or such an
order is proper, or this Court would make such an order,
and whether Oliver Wanglie [Helga's husband] would
are speculative matters not now
execute such an order
32
before the Court.
In this proclamation, the court seems to infer a disregard for
physician autonomy, showing recognition that the court's decision had
not directly determined medical treatment for Wanglie, but in
sidestepping the clash of values between Wanglie's physician 1 and
33
family, nonetheless ensured continued care despite medical objection.

MEISEL,
127 ld.

128
29

1

context of medical decision-making, it is the freedom to have whatever
medical treatment one might wish.
supra note 14, at 13-23.

In re Wanglie, supra note 19, at 374.
Id. at 371.

130 Id.
'"'
132

Id.at 372.

Id. at 377.
Judith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implicationsfor Physician Autonomy, 21
AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 224 (1995).
133
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Patients and their families have also invoked federal statutory
grounds to demand treatment. The federal statutes invoked as source of
a positive right to healthcare include: EMTALA, 3 4 § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 302 of the American with Disabilities Act,
and the Child Abuse Amendment of 1984.135 Although all these federal
statutes can logically be drawn into the debate of patients demanding
medical treatment from their physicians, only EMTALA has been
36
successfully invoked to impose a limited duty to continue treatment.1
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibit discrimination against the
disabled. 137 Proponents of a positive healthcare right have cited Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Section 302 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 to prohibit attempts at withholding or
138
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from the handicapped.
Section 504 prohibits discrimination against an "otherwise
qualified individual with a disability ...solely by reason of his or her
disability ...under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance"' 39 (this includes any hospital receiving Medicaid or

134Supra note

84.

135Erin A. Nealy, Medical Decision-Making For Children: A Struggle For

Autonomy, 49 SMU L. REv. 133, 141-52 (1995-1996). See generally MEISEL,
supra note 14, at 13.06[c][1] (covering the several federal statutory 'positive'
rights).
136 See MEISEL, supra note 14, at 13-28; In re Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590,
594 (4th
Cir. 1994). See also Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349
(4th Cir. 1996). Case recognized that EMTALA is an anti-dumping statute, not a
federal malpractice statute. EMTALA was created to keep hospitals from
turning away patients that needed emergent care. Once that patient is stabilized,
the decisions regarding ongoing treatment is up to the discretion of the facility
and the treating physicians. Therefore, it was not a violation of EMTALA for a
physician to determine that no further life-sustaining treatment should be
provided after 12 days of treatment. This decision is consistent with Baby K,
because the patient in Baby K required emergent care for immediate
stabilization.
37 Nealy, supra note 135, at 141-147.
1Id.at 146.
13929 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). See Nealy, supra note 135, at 142-43.
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Medicare.) 140 The person must be otherwise qualified to receive the care
for there to be discrimination. 4 1 The line of reasoning used to deny
claims of discrimination under Section 504 is as follows: "in spite of the
birth defect, he or she was 'otherwise qualified' to receive the denied
medical treatment. Ordinarily, however, if such a person were not so
handicapped, he or she would not need the medical treatment and thus
would not 'otherwise qualify' for the treatment."'' 42 A futility decision
by a physician would only constitute a violation of Section 504 if the
patient was "otherwise" qualified to receive the treatment the physician
mandate a
recommends withholding. 43 Thus, Section 504 does not
44
physician having to provide futile care, even if demanded.1
In contrast, Section 302 of the ADA applies to discrimination at
all public accommodations, rather than just Medicaid or Medicare funded
facilities.145 Additionally, Section 302 of the ADA does not refer to a
to the
handicapped individual being "otherwise qualified" in regards
46
services in question to qualify for discriminatory protection. 1
Section 302 of the ADA states that:
[D]iscrimination includes -- the imposition or
application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend
to screen out an individual with a disability or any call of
individuals with disabilities .... [u]nless such criteria can
be shown to be necessary for the provision of goods,
supra note 14, at 13-3 1.
U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
142 Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 910 (1993). This decision refers to infants born with birth defects and
is in agreement with the "otherwise qualified" reasoning in United States v.
University Hospital, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d
144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984) "[O]ne would not ordinarily think of a newborn infant
suffering from multiple birth defects as being 'otherwise qualified' to have
corrective surgery performed." Id.
14See Nealy, supra note 135, at 144-45.
140 MEISEL,

14'
29

144Id.
145See

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000);
MEISEL, supra note 14, at 13-32.
146 In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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services,
facilities,
privileges,
advantages,
or
accommodations being offered. 147 Therefore, Section
302 of the ADA carefully permits eligibility criteria for
medical
services to escape the definition of
discrimination.
Mesiel and Cerminara report that "[a] physician's medical
assessment deeming treatment of a patient to be futile may be
characterized as such an eligibility criterion" and thus would not seem to
"constitute discrimination," at least not on their face, without additional
evidence that discriminatory motive was at work. 148 Furthermore, Meisel
and Cerminara report that a Congressional committee has addressed the
issue of eligibility criteria and that nothing
in the ADA was intended to
49
prohibit appropriate medical diagnosing.
Only the Child Abuse Amendments do not provide a
private cause of action. 5 ° They only allow states that receive federal
grants for child abuse and neglect to bring legal action through state child
protective services agencies.' 15 Moreover, the Baby Doe amendments to
the Child Abuse Amendments carry language to ensure that doctors
would not be required to provide futile care. 152 Under the Child Abuse
147 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)

(2000).

148 MEISEL,

supra note 14, at 13-32;

Treatment decisions properly relate to the nature of the condition being
treated. In deciding how to respond to a specific clinical situation,
physicians consider the likely risks and benefits of different courses of
action. A construction of the ADA that displaces bona fide medical
decision-making altogether is at war with clinical medicine.
Nealy, supra note 135, at 146.
149 MEISEL, supra note 14, at 13-32, 33.
150 Nealy, supra note 135, at 147.
'5'Id. at 147-48.
152 The bill enacted defined "withholding or medically indicated treatment"
as:
[T]he term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than
appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in
the treating physician's (or physicians') reasonable medical judgment
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futile if it will
Amendment, "a treatment should not be considered
153
future.'
near
the
in
death
prevent
not
definitely
Furthermore, several state advance directive statutes provide
non-liability clauses for physicians who withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment based on their clinical judgment.' 54 With one
exception, these statutes provide little guidance in regards to the limiting
of the obligation for physicians to provide ongoing care they believe
futile. 5 5 Thus, the debate regarding futility and physician versus patient
autonomy continues in the U.S.
B. The UnitedKingdom
"They know there is such a thing as a free lunch.

Health care

is a banquet, and every bugger in this country thinks he's
here in Britain
156
starving."'

any of the following circumstances apply: (i) The infant is chronically
and irreversibly comatose: (ii) The provision of such treatment would
merely prolong dying, not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all
of the infant's life-threatening conditions, or otherwise be futile in
terms of the survival of the infant; or (iii) The provisions of such
treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant
and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.
45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (2005).
153 MEISEL, supra note 14, at 13-33.

supra note 14 at 13-35. See also, CAL. PROB. CODE § 4735 (West
2005); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 16, § 2508(f) (2005); HAw. REV. STAT. § 327E-7(f)
(2004); See Md. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 00-029 (Nov. 16, 2000) (construing
Maryland's Health Care Decisions Act); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18A, § 5807(F) (Weil, 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(6) (West 2005); NEV.
STAT. ANN. § 449.670 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26-2H-62(d) (West
2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7(F) (West 2005); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon 2005).
'55 Mesiel, supra note 14, at § 13.07. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 166.046
(Vernon 2005) does provide a process-based approach to futility issues that will
provide legal protection to physicians and facilities that follow the codified
frocedure. See discussion infra pp. 45-46.
Eric G. Anderson, Lessons America Should Learn From a Land of 'Free'
Health Care, Managed Care, (Jan. 1997),
154 MEISEL,
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In contrast to the U.S.'s free enterprise approach to medicine, the
U.K. has incorporated a nationalized health service (NHS). 157 Following
the devastation of World War II, Prime Minister Aneurin Bevan
established the NHS on July 5th, 1948, so that the government could
provide health services free of charge to the public. 158 Demand for
medical treatment in the U.K. rapidly increased once the services became
"free." Medical rationing and protracted time periods for health care
were the norm. 59 In 1951, Bevan resigned from his position as Prime
Minister in protest against the NHS introducing charges for dental
care. 16 Just three years after its inception, one of the major issues that
the NHS still struggles161 with today had surfaced: how to pay for
nationalized health care.

1. Withdrawing and Withholding Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment in
the U.K.
Definitive case law regarding medical futility in the U.K.
includes both In re J and Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland.162 Baby J
suffered from cerebral palsy, microcephalia, blindness, and epilepsy as a
result of a serious head injury suffered at the age of one month; J's life
expectancy was short. 163 His physicians, whose view was supported by
NHS and other medical opinion, considered the use of mechanical
ventilation inappropriate. 164 The trial judge ordered that life-prolonging
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9701/9701 .lessons.shtml
visited
Mar. 24, 2006).
57
1

(last

id.

Historic
Figures,
Aneurin
Bevan,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historicfigures/bevananeurin.shtml (last visited
Mar. 24, 2006).
158

See

159 Donald Irvine, The changing relationshipbetween the public and the medical
profession, 94 J. R. SOC. MED. 162. (2001).
160 Historic Figures, Aneurin Bevan, supra note 158.
161 See Irvine, supra note 159.
162 Richard Hamilton, The Law on Dying, 95 J. R. Soc. Med. 565 (2002); Brody

& Gillon, supra note 20, at n. 2. See generally In re J, [1992] 3 W.L.R. 507
(Fam), [1993] Fam. 15 (Eng.).
163 In re J, supra, note 162.
164 See id.
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measures be applied pending further hearings. 65 On appeal, the court
refused to require that J's physicians treat him if the physician's clinical
judgment had determined that it was not in his patient's best interest,
even if the patient's family wanted continued treatment.' 66

"It is

impracticable, and unlikely to be in the patient's best interests, to compel
skill in a specified manner against his
a doctor to exercise 1his
67
professional judgment."'

Airedale N.H.S. Trust Respondents v. Bland is the first U.K. case
to address under what circumstances a physician can legally withdraw
168
life-sustaining treatment, without which the patient would die.
Anthony Bland suffered injuries as a spectator at a soccer match which
resulted in his PSV state.' 69 Three years after the accident, the Airedale
NHS Trust, with the support of Bland's parents, requested a declaration
stating that withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, ventilation,
and further medical treatment would not be unlawful. 70 The House of
Lords accepted that artificial nutrition and hydration, which they defined
as a medial treatment, could lawfully be withdrawn on the basis of
Bland's "best interest.' 7' The House of Lords further required that a
declaration from the court must be obtained in PVS cases "that continued
treatment and care no longer confer any benefit" before life-sustaining
treatment is removed. 172 Bland has been applied in several PVS and
borderline PVS cases in the U.K. 173 In every instance, the courts have
reported that in making a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
"it is not imposing death but is, rather, not taking any steps to prolong
life."' 174 The British Medical Association (BMA) published guidelines
regarding the withholding or withdrawing of treatment in 1999,
identifying other non-beneficial treatments that courts need not review
165
166
67

1
168

Id.
Id.

Id. at 4.
Airedale N.H.S. Trust Respondents v. Bland [1993] A.C. 789, 797 (Eng.).

169 id.

0
17
Id.at 789.

171Id. at
172

896-899.
Id. at 789.

173Id.

174Hamilton,

supra note 162, at 565.
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for physicians to terminate treatment.' 75 Thus, physician autonomy and
"benefiting the patient" by not prolonging life have been paramount
concerns in the U.K. from which the courts have ruled for the
discontinuance of non-beneficial care.
Furthermore, both the General Medical Counsel (GMC) and the
BMA have issued guidelines that allow for the withdrawal of treatment
"when it is futile in that it cannot accomplish any improvement, when it
would not be in the patient's best interest to continue treatment (because,
for example, it is simply prolonging' 76the dying process) or when the
patient has refused further treatment.,'
The GMC is a statutory body established under the Medical Act
of 1858 to "protect, promote and maintain the health and safety of the
public by ensuring proper standards in the practice of medicine."' 7 7 The
Medical Act authorizes the GMC to license physicians to practice in the
The guidance provided by the GMC for physicians on
U.K.178
withholding and withdrawing futile care' 79 creates no statutory legal
obligation, 80 although courts have reviewed its guidance in court
decisions.1

175 Laurence Oates, The Courts' Role in Decisions about Medical Treatment,
321 BRIT. MED. J. 1282 (2000). For further discussion regarding the British

Medical Association see infra pp. note 181.
176
End of Life Decisions -

Views of the BMA, at
http://www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/Endoflife (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
177 Role of the GMC [General Medical Counsel], at http://www.gmcuk.org/about/role/index.asp
(last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
178
id.

179 General Medical Council, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging

Treatments: Good Practice in Decision-Making (2002), at http://www.gmcuk.org/guidance/library/standards/witholdinglifeprolonging-guidance.asp

(last

visited Mar. 27, 2006).
180

UK Clinical Ethics Network Section D. Professional Guidelines, Law and

Ethics,

at

network.org.uk/reading/Guide/SectionD/sectionD.htm
2006).

http://www.ethics(last visited Mar. 27,

2006]

COMMUNICATING PAST CONFLICT

The BMA is a voluntary association of physicians, with a total
81
membership of over 137,000, including over 19,000 medical students.
The BMA produces numerous publications regarding ethical issues
including, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical
Treatment: Guidance for Decision Making, which like the GMC's

guidelines are not legally binding, but
can be taken into account by the
82
courts in addressing specific cases.'
2. The Human Rights Act of 1998
The Human Rights Act (1998) came into effect October 2, 2000
in the U.K. It incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms into U.K. domestic law. The main purpose
of the Convention "is to safeguard human rights and fundamental
freedoms and to maintain and promote the values of a democratic
society."183
Any inconsistency between current U.K. legislation and the
Convention can be challenged in domestic courts and also in the
European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, public authorities (e.g.
the NHS Trust, doctors)
must comply with the Convention's guidelines
84
for medical care.'
The Articles of the Convention that have had major impact on
healthcare are Article 2 (the right to life), 3 (the prohibition on torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment), 5 (the right to liberty and security),
and 8 (the right to respect for private and family life). None of these
rights is absolute but Article 3 represents an absolute prohibition and
cannot be interfered with by the State under any circumstances. Article 2
181

BMA

[British

Medical

Association],

About

the

BMA,

http://www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/Hubaboutthebma (last visited Mar. 24,
2006).
182 UK Clinical Ethics, supra note 172.
183 Ash Samanta & Jo Samanta, The Human Rights Act 1998 - Why Should it
Matterfor Medical Practice?,98 J. R. SOC. MED. 404 (2005).

Department of Health - Human Rights Act
1998 FAQ,
http://www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/EqualityAndHumanRights/Equality
AndHumanRightsArticle/fs/en?CONTENTID=4054183 &chk=QOxVM9 (last
visited Mar. 27, 2006).
184
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and 5 are subject to limited exceptions. Article 8 is a qualified obligation
that requires a balance to be struck between the interests of the individual
and the wider interests of society. Any limitation or constraint imposed
by a public body must be justified as being 'proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. 185
ECHR guidelines will have a lasting effect on the healthcare
practices in the U.K. The ECHR has been actively involved in issues
regarding life and death (e.g., withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment).186 Article 2 has been interpreted by U.K. courts to as
87
containing a negative right to not intentionally and illegally take a life.'
In Re A, "[t]he Court of Appeals took the view that Article 2 imposed a
duty to protect the stronger twin and not just a negative duty of
preventing death for the weaker twin. '88 The surgery to separate the
twins was justified by saving the life of the stronger twin and not
"intentionally" taking the life of the weaker twin.' 89 Furthermore, Article
185
86

1

Samanta & Samanta, supra note 183.

Id.at 405.

id.
118Id.at 405.
187

189

Rationale behind the decision:
[The purpose of the application] was to preserve the life of J

and not to cause the death of M, it was inappropriate in the
unique circumstances to characterise foresight of M's
accelerated death as amounting to criminal intent; that the
protection of a person's right to life in article 2 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms did not import any prohibition,
additional to that under English common law, to the proposed
operation, and "intentionally" in its ordinary and natural
meaning applied only to cases where the purpose of the
prohibited action was to cause death; that (per Ward LJ) in
essence there was no difference between resorting to
legitimate self-defence and the doctors coming to J's defence
and removing the threat of fatal harm to her presented by M's
draining her lifeblood; and that, accordingly, the operation
could be lawfully carried out.
Inre A, [2001] Fam 147, 2000 WL 1274054 (CA (Civ Div)).
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2's negative right has been interpreted to authorize the continued
removal of artificial hydration and nutrition because, the illness, not the
treatment (artificial nutrition and hydration), would be the cause of the
patient's death.
Additionally, withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment would not violate Article 3 if doing so would be in the
patient's best interest.190 But Article 3 has been interpreted to allow
courts, not physicians to determine the patient's "best interest" where
91
there are disputes about proposed treatment for incompetent patients. 1
However, the confusion surrounding the ECHR in U.K. court
systems continues as represented by the case of Leslie Burke.' 92 Mr.
Burke, who suffered from a degenerative brain condition, was afraid that
artificial nutrition and hydration could be withdrawn against his wishes
according to the GMC's "Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging
Treatments: Good Practice in Decision-Making" guidelines. 193 The
High Court ruled that GMC's guidance was in violation of Articles 3 and
8 of the Human Rights Act of 1998. The Honourable Mr. Justice Munby
ruled that not only do patients have a right to demand the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment, but they also have a positive right to demand
treatment in certain circumstances. Judge Munby acknowledged that in
addressing this
ethical issue, further important issues of limited resources
194
are involved.
On appeal by the GMC, the Court of Appeal ruled that Mr.
Burkes' concerns were adequately addressed by the GMC's guidelines
195
regarding withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging treatment.
The Court of Appeal held that physicians cannot deny competent patients
Samanta & Samanta, supra note 183, at 405.
'9' Id. at 406.
190
192

See

BBC

News,

Patient

Wins

Right-to-Life

Ruling,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/3938879.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006); BBC
News, PatientLoses Right-to-Food Ccase, supra note 37.
193 Tom Woodcock & Robert Wheeler, Glass v United Kingdom and Burke v
General Medical Council. Judicial interpretation of European Convention
Rights for patients in the United Kingdom Facing Decisions about LifeSustaining Treatment, 31 INTENSIVE CARE MED. 885 (2005).
194 Id.

195 BBC News, PatientLoses Right-to-Food Case, supra note 37.
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artificial nutrition or hydration, unless during the final stages of their
1 96
illnesses artificial nutrition and hydration could not prolong their lives.
Thus, artificial nutrition and hydration can be withdrawn from Mr. Burke
only during the end stages of his illness when he lapses into a coma;
97
when he can no longer express his desire for life-prolonging treatment.'
IV. Communicating Past the Conflict
The basic problem with futility is that the clinical reality of the
uniqueness of patients and diseases results in judgments of futility
that
98
are not easily formulated into a general substantive definition.,
Futility is a value laden judgment; it should be seen as unique to
each patient and family, and thus a universal consensus regarding futile
care is unlikely. Rather than relying on a definitive definition of futility,
several organizations have moved towards recommending a process that
would allow a thorough review of the futility dispute in a fair and open
environment that requires communication
between patients and their
199
families, doctors, and facilities.
Failure to communicate about diagnosis and prognosis often
2
causes increased discord amongst patients, families, and physicians; 00
this lack of communication may ultimately lead to the courtroom.2 °'
Establishing effective communication standards between patients, their
families, and physicians leads to mutual understanding regarding

196

Clare Dyer, Court rules in favour of GMC's guidance on withholding

BRIT. MED. J. 309 (2005) (The GMC's president Graeme Catto
said, "[o]ur guidance makes it clear that patients should never be discriminated
against on the grounds of disability. And we have always said that causing
patients to die from and dehydration is unacceptable practice and unlawful.").

treatment, 331

197 Id.

Amir Halevv & Baruch A. Brody, A Multi-institutionCollaborativePolicy on
Medical Futility, 276 J.AM. MED. Assoc. 571, 571 (1996).
198

' 99 Id. at 574.
200

201

Fins, supra note 48, at 1322.
In the Matter of Baby "K", 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993); Woodcock &

Wheeler, supra note 178.
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Furthermore, process-based approaches to futile care

may even provide legal protection for physicians or facilities' decisions
to withdraw non-beneficial care against the desires of patients or
families.20 3
A. Moving Towards a Process-BasedApproach

Recognizing the "futility" of attempting to define futile care,
several health care organizations started defining a process to address the
issue of futile care with patients and their families.20 4 These policies
were developed to provide physicians, patients, and their families with an
avenue to collaboratively approach the futility decision. This approach
allowed the definition of futility to be moved away from one physician or
hospital treatment team to a facility ethics committee. This approach
approach
may also provided the opportunity to create a community-wide
20 5
to futility, while respecting the input of the patient or family.
One of the earliest process-based approaches created was the
Houston (Texas) policy. 20 6

The Houston policy was a collaborative

effort of a diverse task force which included most of Houston, Texas'
hospitals. The Houston policy allowed a patient to transfer to another
physician or facility if no resolution could be reached. However, if
another physician or facility would not accept the transfer, the attending
physician or facility would not be responsible for continued futile care.
"[Ethics] consultations were associated with reduced hospital stays and
treatment costs and were deemed effective in resolving conflicts that were
blocking the way of more appropriate comfort care." Gilmer et al., supra note
35, at 967.
203 See generally, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon
2003).
204 See generally, Health Council of South Florida, supra note 3, at 30-44.
202

205

American Medical Association, Medical Futility in End-of-Life Care, CEJA

at
http://www.ama(June
1997),
available
Op.
2.037
assn.org/ama/pub/category/8390.html
206 A committee was formed in August of 1993 with representation from most of
the major Houston hospitals. After two years, "Guidelines on Institutional
Policies on the Determination of Medically Inappropriate Interventions" were
presented for institutional approval at the various Houston hospitals. Halevy &
Brody, supra note 198, at 571.
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Regardless of transfer options, the policy stated that patient abandonment
is prohibited. Only interventions that are deemed non-beneficial could
be ceased; other care that preserved the comfort and dignity of the patient
must be continued.2 °7
In 1999, the American Medical Association Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs published its recommendation for a due processbased approach to futility determinations in the Journal of the American
Medical Association (JAMA).2 °8
The process includes at least 4 steps aimed at
deliberation and resolution including all involved parties
[physicians, patient, and family], 2 steps aimed at
securing alternatives and resolutions including all
involved parties, 2 steps aimed at securing alternatives in
the case of irreconcilable differences, and a final step
aimed at closure when all alternatives have been
exhausted.0 9
Recognizing that there are "necessary value judgments involved
in coming to the assessment of futility," the American Medical
Association's (AMA) process requires that futility judgments account for
patients' or proxies' input. 210
This process utilizes the same procedures that hospital ethics
committees have been using for years, with attempts to transfer the
patient if a mutual agreement could not be reached regarding the
patient's continued care.2 ' If no alternative provider can be found, the
Council's guidance allows the futile intervention to be discontinued (that
is, as determined by the process involving the patient/proxy, physicians,
and institutional committee).

207

Id. at 572-73.

208

American Medical Association, supra note 15, at 939.

209

Id.

210

id.

211

Robert L. Fine, Medical Futility and the Texas Advance Directives Act of

1999, 13 BAYLOR U. MED. CENTER PROC.

144 (2000),

http://www.baylorhealth.edu/proceedings/13_2/13_2_fine.html.
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Legal considerations are of paramount concern when discussing
the discontinuation of care. Although no formal recognition of a
"positive" right to demand treatment has taken place, patient autonomy
for healthcare decisions must be carefully balanced against physicians'
autonomy to make clinical decisions.21 2 Litigation regarding futility has
remained constant, but limited, since the early 1990s. 213 Having set forth
their policy, the AMA did note legal ramifications of withholding
treatment are unknown. 21 4 One case in the U.S. that has found in favor
of physician autonomy to withhold non-beneficial care is Gilgunn v.
Massachusetts General Hospital.215

This case involves a physician

ordering a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order without the family's
consent. 216 After the patient died, the family sued the hospital and
21721
The jury ruled in favor of the physician and hospital.2 18
physician.
Yet this case is not precedent setting because the reasons for the jury
finding for the defendants was not recorded.219
Even with legal protection unknown, process based approaches
to futility issues provide benefits to both physicians and facilities. They
can provide treatment clarity and assist with a transition from a curative
to a palliative model free from conflict between patient, families, and
facilities. 220 Furthermore, one recent study regarding ethics consults in
the intensive care unit reported "that ethics consultations reduced
hospital spending and hastened death among those who ultimately die in
supra note 14 at § 13.02.
Id. at 13-5.
214 American Medical Association, supra note 15.
215 John Ellement, Jury Sides with Doctors on Ending Woman's Life Support,
212 MEISEL,
213

BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1995, at 18.
216
id.

217 id.
2 18

id.

219

Stanley A. Nasraway, Unilateral withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy: Is it

215
(2001),
available at
29
CRIT.
CARE
MED.
time?,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&lis
t uids= 1 1200242&dopt=
Abstract.
220 Robert L. Fine & Thomas W. Mayo, Resolution of Futility by Due Process:
Early Experience with the Texas Advance Directive Act, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED., 743, 744-745 (2003).
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[the] hospital after a prolonged stay. ' , 2 In follow-up interviews with
nurses, physicians, and patients, more than 90 percent of the health care
professionals and 80 percent of patients or proxies agreed that
ethics
222
consultations were useful in determining appropriate treatment.
In the U.K., the Human Rights Act 1998 requires that physicians
must consult with patients and their families in making treatment
decisions.223 Additionally, beginning in April 2002, each NHS in the
U.K. is required to have Patient Advocacy and Liaison Services (PALS)
advocates to assist patients and families with medical decisions. 22 4 The
implementation of PALS advocates recognizes the need for the inclusion
of the patient's view in determination of treatment decisions, even
though U.K. courts, unlike the U.S. courts, generally side with the
decisions of the physicians
regarding issues of withdrawing or
225
withholding futile care.

B. Legalizing the Withholding or Withdrawal of Futile Care in the U.S.

One state does recognize the ability for physicians and facilities
to withhold or withdraw futile care. The Texas Advanced Directives Act
of 1999 not only combined several laws dealing with end-of-life
decisions into a single statue, it provided a due-process approach to futile
care which provides legal protection to physicians and facilities that
follow the statutory guideline. 226 This statute, an evolution of the
Houston policy, was enacted into Texas law shortly after the American

221

Gilmer et al., supra note 35, at 969.

222

Id.

Abhay K. Das, The Value of an Ethics History?, 98 J. R.. SOC. MED. 262
(2005).
223
224

Kay Lurie, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-ProlongingTreatments: Good

Practice In Decision-Making The Role of the Patient's Advocate, Bamet

Community
Health
Council,
(June
http:www.barnetchc.org.uk/scrutiny/withholding.htm
2006).
225

Id.

Fine, supra note 211; See also,
166.046 (Vernon 2003).

226

20,
2001),
at
(last visited Mar. 25,

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
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Medical227Association published their medical futility in end-of-life care
policy.
Fine and Mayo in Resolutions of Futility by Due Process: Early
Experiences with the Texas Advance Directives Acts state:
[T]he greatest significance of the law is how it changes
the nature of conversations between providers and
patients' families about futile-treatment situations by
providing conceptual and temporal boundaries. ... [I]t
places limits on families and surrogates who request
therapies that the profession consider futile. At the same
time, if forces the profession to think carefully about the
concept, for if another physician and facility are willing
to provide the futile treatment, then the law does not
allow withdrawal of that treatment on grounds of futility.
The law also provides temporal boundaries (1228days) for
resolving disagreements over futile treatment.2
They further encourage other states to look at the Texas futile
for possible changes in statutory
care process as a starting point 229
regulation regarding medical futility.
CONCLUSION

"Futility" is a value-laden concept that escapes
definition. Physicians, healthcare facilities, and patients in the U.S. and
U.K. have struggled with end-of-life decisions regarding futile care due
to the lack of a definitive definition of futility. These struggles have
often ended up in the legal system, moving the decision of appropriate
medical care away from the physicians or family to the discretion of a
judge or jury. With the ever-increasing cost of health care and the
explosion of medical technology, the struggle to differentiate appropriate
care from futile care will continue, increasing conflict among health care
Telephone Interview with Professor Tom Mayo, Director, Cary M. Maguire
Center for Ethics and Public Responsibility, SMU, Tex. (Oct. 20, 2005).
228 Fine & Mayo, supra note 220, at 746.
229 Id.
227
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facilities, physicians, and families with patient's continued care caught in
the balance.23 °
Instead of focusing on defining futile scenarios, physicians and
healthcare facilities should focus on providing appropriate
communication to assist the patient and family in making end-of-life
decisions. This process-based approach to futile care will establish
appropriate boundaries for patients and families to address the issue of
appropriate care by providing a process in which they can communicate
with health care professionals, as well as establish collaborative goals for
treatment after treatment options are reviewed. Furthermore, this
collaborative approach will decrease the conflict between physicians and
patients, leading to a decrease in overall healthcare cost and
patient/physician satisfaction.
By providing the ability for patient transfer, process-based
approaches will open the definition of "futility" to a community-wide
standard, making healthcare professionals think very carefully about
transfer will prevent
deeming a treatment futile, because acceptance of
23 1
the removal of treatment on the grounds of futility.
Withdrawal of treatment is a treatment of last resort; whether
made by a patient, physician, or a patient's family, the decision deeming
care futile should only be determined after careful deliberation and
consultation with all appropriate parties. Clearly, defined processedbased approaches should provide the opportunity for collaboration of
physicians, families, and patients, thus allowing the patient's best interest
to determine treatment (whether it is palliative care or continued
treatment for the illness at hand).

See generally, Gilmer et al., supra note 35 (surveying the increasing cost of
health care in today's world).
231 Fine & Mayo, supra 220, at 746.
230

